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ESSAY

PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION:
TOTALITY TESTS OR RIGID RULES?

KIT KINPORTS†
INTRODUCTION
Since its decision more than thirty years ago in Illinois v. Gates,1 the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion
requirements—the probable cause required to arrest and search, the reasonable
suspicion needed to stop and frisk—are totality-of-the-circumstances tests.
Gates overturned Supreme Court precedent that had held for nearly two
decades that a tip did not give rise to probable cause absent evidence that
the informant both (1) was honest and (2) had a reliable basis for her
information.2 Rejecting this “rigid” two-part test, the Gates Court stressed
that probable cause is a “fluid,” “practical, common-sense” concept that is
“not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”3
The Court has used similar language to explain the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis applied when measuring the lower quantum of proof
necessary to create reasonable suspicion.4 With the exception of one
outlier—Illinois v. Wardlow, which articulated the sweeping rule that
“[h]eadlong flight” in a “high crime area” constitutes reasonable suspicion5—

† Professor of Law and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State University
Dickinson School of Law.
1 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
2 Id. at 228-39 (overturning Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).
3 Id. at 231-32, 238.
4 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (observing that “the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account”).
5 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
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the Court has repeatedly recited the common-sense, totality-of-the-circumstances
mantra when defining both probable cause and reasonable suspicion.6
In two recent opinions, however, the Court has strayed from this path,
leaning towards reliance on bright-line rules to define probable cause and
reasonable suspicion. Perhaps not surprisingly, these deviations have come
in cases where a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is more likely to
favor criminal defendants. And both times, the tests that have emerged
from the Court’s rulings have tended to oversimplify by exaggerating the
reliability of the information used by the police.
I. THE ROAD TO NAVARETTE
In the first case, Florida v. Harris, a unanimous Supreme Court held, in
essence, that a positive alert by a certified or recently trained narcotics-detection
dog creates probable cause to search.7 In so doing, the Court exhibited
overconfidence in the accuracy of drug dogs and glossed over questions about
their reliability.8 The Court claimed that its opinion called for an examination
of “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert,” just like “every inquiry into
probable cause.”9 But that assertion was presumably based on the Court’s
caveat that defendants must be given an opportunity to present “conflicting
evidence”—either by cross-examining the dog’s handler or presenting their
own witnesses at the suppression hearing.10
As I have previously argued, this proviso does not give defendants a
meaningful opportunity to contest the prosecution’s probable cause showing,
because defense counsel is unlikely to have access to the critical information
about a dog’s training and field performance needed to mount a credible
challenge to its reliability.11 For all practical purposes, then, Harris resembles
a bright-line test, like the rules Gates and its progeny avoided, and not the
“more flexible, all-things-considered approach” the Harris Court purported
to use.12
6 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003); Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996).
7 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
8 See Kit Kinports, The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 NW. U. L. REV .
COLLOQUY 64, 67 (2013) (“Though the scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs is still
developing, research has shown that a significant percentage of positive alerts do not lead to the
discovery of narcotics.” (footnotes omitted)).
9 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058.
10 Id. at 1057.
11 Kinports, supra note 8, at 65-66.
12 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56.
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This trend continued, though somewhat less blatantly, with last Term’s
opinion in Navarette v. California.13 The question on which the Court
granted certiorari was whether the Fourth Amendment “require[s] an
officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless
driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.”14
The stage for Navarette was set in Florida v. J.L., where the Court
unanimously held that an anonymous tip claiming that a certain individual
is carrying a weapon does not, “without more,” create the reasonable
suspicion necessary for a Terry stop and frisk.15 Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in that case concluded that an anonymous call, which reported that
a young African-American male wearing a plaid shirt was at a bus stop and
in possession of a weapon, lacked the requisite “indicia of reliability” to give
rise to reasonable suspicion.16 Although the police were able to corroborate
that someone matching the caller’s description was at the designated bus
stop, the Court explained that reasonable suspicion mandates that “a tip be
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a
determinate person.”17
The J.L. Court thus distinguished Alabama v. White,18 an earlier decision
involving an anonymous phone call that accused a woman of possessing
cocaine. The White Court had characterized that case as a “close” one and
cautioned that the tip alone was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.19
But the majority ultimately found that the police were justified in conducting
a Terry stop, once they were able to corroborate that the informant had
correctly predicted the woman would leave a particular apartment complex
at a specified time and had accurately described the vehicle she was driving
and the direction in which she was heading.20 Notably, the White Court did
not consider the description of the woman’s vehicle to be particularly
significant, given that “[a]nyone could have ‘predicted’ that fact because it
was a condition presumably existing at the time of the call.”21 Nevertheless,
the informant’s “ability to predict [White’s] future behavior”—something
“[t]he general public would have no way of knowing”—suggested that the

13 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
14 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490).
15 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000) (interpreting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which

the legal standards for stops and frisks).
16 Id. at 271.
17 Id. at 272.
18 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
19 Id. at 329, 332; see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (calling White a “borderline” case).
20 White, 496 U.S. at 331-32.
21 Id. at 332.
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informant had “inside information” and therefore made it “likely” that the
caller also had “access to reliable information about [White’s] illegal activities.”22
When J.L. distinguished White ten years later, the Court recognized the
dangers associated with weapons, but refused to create a “firearm exception”
to the traditional standards governing reasonable suspicion.23 Nevertheless,
the J.L. Court admonished that “extraordinary dangers sometimes justify
unusual precautions” and declined to “speculate” whether other circumstances—
such as an anonymous tip concerning a bomb—might present a “danger . . .
so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability.”24
Picking up on that dictum, a number of lower courts began to endorse a
drunk-driving exception that allowed the police to stop a vehicle based
solely on an anonymous tip.25 The issue attracted the Supreme Court’s
attention in 2009, when Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case involving the validity of a
drunk-driving stop.26 The two Justices hinted strongly that they disapproved
of the lower court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion demanded that a
law enforcement official personally witness erratic driving: they reasoned
that drunk driving generates more immediate risks than the concealed
weapon in J.L., and that requiring the police to give intoxicated drivers “one
free swerve” may lead to a fatal accident.27
II. THE RULING IN NAVARETTE
When the same question returned to the Court last Term in Navarette,
the majority ultimately purported to duck it by holding only that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving on the facts of the case.28 (Interestingly, this ruling seems more
responsive to the second issue raised in the petition for certioari,29 a more
22 Id. But see id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that many commuters leave home at
the same time and travel in a certain direction on a daily basis).
23 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
24 Id. at 272-73.
25 See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 n.2 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citing an opinion from the Eighth Circuit and nine state supreme court decisions).
26 Id. at 10.
27 Id. at 12.
28 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 1692 (2014).
29 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (“Does
an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road provide reasonable suspicion to
stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless
driver, and the officer could not corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect
vehicle for several miles?”).
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fact-specific question which the Court declined to review.)30 But, as noted
in the dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, “[b]e not deceived.”31 Notwithstanding the majority’s
assertion, Navarette, like the prior Term’s drug-dog ruling in Florida v.
Harris, is likely to have the practical effect of creating a bright-line rule: that
reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises whenever an informant claims
to have witnessed even a single instance of certain risky driving behaviors.
And, like Harris, this test tends to oversimplify by exaggerating the reliability
of the information in the hands of the police, a misstep that will only prove
more damaging if the lower courts later take steps to further dilute the rule.
The anonymous tip in Navarette was a 911 call claiming that the driver of
a silver Ford 150 pickup truck had run the informant off an undivided two-lane
road five minutes earlier.32 The caller provided the truck’s license number,
location, and direction of travel.33 Approximately eighteen minutes after the
reported incident, the police located the truck nineteen miles up the road.34
An officer followed the vehicle for approximately five minutes without
observing any traffic violations or erratic driving, then pulled the truck
over.35 The police smelled marijuana surrounding the vehicle and ultimately
discovered thirty pounds of that drug in the truck.36
In initially finding sufficient “indicia of reliability” to allow the police
“to credit the caller’s account,” Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority
relied on three factors.37 First, the caller was an actual witness to the
dangerous driving behavior and thus had a credible basis for her information.38
Second, the tip was relatively contemporaneous, enhancing its reliability.39
Finally, 911 tips are less likely to be fraudulent because today’s 911 system
permits law enforcement to record calls and identify a caller’s phone
number and location, thereby preventing dishonest informants from relying
on their anonymity.40
30 See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting review on only the first question
presented in the petition for certiorari).
31 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the lineup in Navarette may
seem somewhat strange, Justice Scalia has increasingly joined forces with the three more liberal
female Justices in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980
(2013); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013).
32 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686-87.
33 Id. at 1686.
34 See id. at 1687.
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1688.
38 Id. at 1689.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1689-90.
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The majority next concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion
that the driver of the truck was intoxicated because the tip involved “more
than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of
drunk or reckless driving.”41 The Court reasoned that, like weaving and
driving in the wrong lane (and unlike seatbelt and minor speeding violations),
running another car off the road is a form of “erratic behavior[] . . . strongly
correlated with drunk driving” and not merely “an isolated example of
recklessness.”42 Additionally, the Court rejected the Petitioners’ argument
that reasonable suspicion was undermined by the police officer’s inability to
corroborate any dangerous driving even after following the truck for five
minutes. Rather, the Court found it “hardly surprising that the appearance
of a marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a time.”43
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NAVARETTE
Rather than picking up on J.L.’s dictum and expressly recognizing a
“drunk driving exception” to the usual standards governing reasonable
suspicion, the Navarette Court distinguished J.L. on the grounds that the tip
in Navarette was supported by “stronger” evidence of reliability.44 The
Court likewise devoted little attention to the State of California’s primary
contentions that driving while intoxicated is a peculiarly dangerous crime
(creating a “grave and imminent threat” compared to the “inchoate risk”
present in J.L.) and that the severity of the crime is a relevant factor to be
balanced in assessing reasonable suspicion.45 The majority’s sole reference to
the dangers of drunk driving came towards the end of its opinion, where
Justice Thomas mentioned that Navarette would be a “particularly
inappropriate” vehicle for deviating from the standard doctrine that police
may conduct a stop as soon as they have reasonable suspicion, because

41 Id. at 1691.
42 Id.
43 Id. But see id.

at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “no mere act of the will can
resist” the effects of intoxication on driving).
44 Id. at 1692 (majority opinion).; cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013) (plurality
opinion) (refusing to recognize a per se exigency in drunk driving cases because, although the
crime “exact[s] a terrible toll . . . the general importance of the government’s interest . . . does not
justify departing from” the standard approach to the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement).
45 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 30-32, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); see
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-21, Navarette, 134
S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (taking a similar position).
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“allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have
disastrous consequences.”46
The Court wisely chose not to venture down the path suggested by the
State. A number of Fourth Amendment scholars have advocated a similar
sliding-scale approach, with the requisite quantum of proof varying based
on not only the gravity of the crime, but also factors such as the intrusiveness
of the police action and the immediacy of the need for police intervention.47
But the Court has steered clear of this amorphous, ad hoc approach, which
“could only produce more slide than scale.”48 The Court has never envisioned
that judges would conduct a balancing test or apply differing definitions of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion based on the severity of the crime.49
Thus, the briefs filed by the State and the federal government in
Navarette were forced to resort to irrelevant Supreme Court precedent.50
They cited cases like Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court balanced the competing
interests at stake in deciding “as a general proposition” that the Fourth
Amendment allows certain exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements.51 The briefs also relied on opinions that applied a balancing

46 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691-92.
47 See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Making

the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS.
L.J. 279, 323 (2004) (advocating that “the fiction of one uniform definition of probable cause . . .
be replaced with a flexible sliding scale that takes into account the severity of the intrusion and the
magnitude of the threat”); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
951, 1014 (2003) (proposing “a reasonableness framework for analyzing questions of probable cause
that draws upon Learned Hand’s test for evaluating claims of negligence”); Christopher Slobogin,
The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 609 (2007) (criticizing
the “unitary probable cause standard”).
48 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 (1974).
49 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (noting that “[t]he ‘long-prevailing
standards’ of probable cause embodied ‘the best compromise’” of competing interests, and
therefore “[this] standard [of probable cause] applied to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’
the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations” (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))).
50 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 10-12, 26-28, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 129490); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-26, Navarette,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490).
51 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177,
187-88 (2004) (upholding a state statute that required suspects to disclose their names during Terry
stops); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303-06 (1999) (extending the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement to searches of passengers’ belongings); California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 392-93 (1985) (allowing warrantless searches of automobiles when “the overriding standard of
probable cause is met”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1985) (permitting Terry
stops to investigate past felony offenses); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-06 (1983)
(authorizing the brief detention of luggage at airports based on reasonable suspicion).
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test in assessing the constitutionality of administrative inspection programs,52
as well as cases considering the severity of the threat posed by a defendant
when evaluating the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of force.53 On
none of these occasions, however, did the Court use a balancing test to
determine whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed on a
given set of facts.54
In a few isolated circumstances, the Court has inexplicably chosen to
resolve a Fourth Amendment case by using a free-wheeling balancing test—
on the theory that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”55 Those decisions, however,
were limited to permitting certain searches on the understanding that
reasonable suspicion already existed or was not required.56 Admittedly, the
most recent of those opinions, Maryland v. King, purported to restrict DNA
testing to suspects who had been arrested for “a serious offense.”57 But the
Court’s recitation of the government interests served by identifying
arrestees through DNA tests had little to do with the gravity of the crime of
arrest.58 In fact, the majority repeatedly mentioned the importance of
ascertaining whether someone detained for a minor offense had a violent
criminal history.59 This reasoning prompted the dissenters to observe that
“an entirely predictable consequence” of the Court’s ruling is to allow DNA
testing of all arrestees because no “principle could possibly justify” confining
the holding to serious crimes.60

52 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (allowing sobriety roadblocks);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) (permitting body-cavity inspections of pretrial detainees);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-63 (1976) (upholding immigration checkpoints).
53 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383-84 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
54 See Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 649, 655 (2009) (noting that Terry and its progeny did not anticipate the use of a balancing test
to analyze the existence of reasonable suspicion).
55 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1969-70 (2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
56 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (allowing DNA testing of suspects arrested for “serious
offense[s]”); Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (upholding state statute authorizing suspicionless searches of
parolees); Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22 (permitting searches of a probationer’s person and property
based on reasonable suspicion).
57 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
58 See id. at 1970-75 (citing the government interests in determining the arrestee’s identity,
preventing harm to jailhouse staff and detainees, guaranteeing the defendant’s presence at trial,
assisting in bail decisions, and exonerating innocent persons).
59 See id. at 1971-74.
60 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, there is no precedent in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
for applying a balancing approach or considering the severity of the crime
when assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Any move towards a
sliding-scale approach would create intractable line-drawing problems, for,
as Justice Kagan observed during oral argument in Navarette, “all crime
represents a threat to public safety.”61
The Navarette majority not only declined to create a drunk-driving
exception to the standards governing reasonable suspicion, but also refused
to explicitly endorse the rigid rules advocated by the State of California and
the federal government. Both of them claimed that their views were
consistent with the Court’s traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,62
and, ironically, even accused the Petitioners of deviating from that approach
by calling for police corroboration of anonymous tips.63 In fact, however,
both the State and the Solicitor General actually proposed sweeping rules.
The State argued that reasonable suspicion arises whenever an anonymous
911 call “report[s] the caller’s personal observation of drunk or reckless
driving and provid[es] a detailed description of the vehicle, its location, and
direction of travel” and the police find a vehicle matching that description
in the vicinity.64 The Solicitor General urged the Court to articulate an
even broader version of this rule, which would not require the informant to
specify that she had personally witnessed any erratic driving.65 The Solicitor
General defended this position on the ground that a “description of the

61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 129490); see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has not
recognized exceptions to probable cause and reasonable suspicion even to “prevent and detect
murder”); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272-73 (2000) (warning that a weapons exception to the
reasonable suspicion requirement could not be “securely confine[d],” thereby “allowing the
exception to swallow the rule”).
62 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 24-25, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28-29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct.
1683 (No. 12-9490).
63 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 33, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (arguing
that Petitioners “fail[ed] to consider the differences between tips reporting possessory offenses and
those reporting observation of drunk driving”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (asserting that Petitioners
would “mak[e] future predictions the sole acceptable index of reliability in cases where officers do
not witness criminal activity themselves”).
64 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 24, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490).
65 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12, Navarette,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (arguing that law enforcement officials have reasonable suspicion
when “an anonymous 911 call report[s] reckless or drunken driving” and they “corroborate the
location and description of the vehicle”).
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details of a reckless or drunken driving episode . . . supports an inference
that the caller’s basis of knowledge is eyewitness observation.”66
Although the Navarette dissenters accused the majority of adopting the
views of the Solicitor General,67 that claim is something of an overstatement.
As noted above, the majority relied heavily on the proposition that the 911
caller in Navarette was an actual eyewitness to the erratic driving.68 Just as
in J.L., then, the Court rejected the federal government’s argument that
reasonable suspicion arises whenever an anonymous tip “provides a description
of a particular person at a particular location illegally carrying a concealed
firearm” (or, in Navarette, driving under the influence) and “police promptly
verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence of the firearm”
(or, here, reckless driving behavior).69
Whether the Court’s opinion in essence endorsed the rule advanced by
the State is a closer question. Admittedly, the Court cited two factors
beyond the test proposed by the State in reaching its initial conclusion that
the 911 call contained sufficient indicia of reliability for the police to give it
credence: (1) the timing of the tip and (2) law enforcement’s ability to trace
911 calls.70 But those factors do not differentiate Navarette’s facts from most
other cases involving anonymous tips. Even the information provided in
J.L. was presumably contemporaneous given that the police found a young
man matching the caller’s description when they arrived at the bus stop.71
Moreover, caller ID is “widely available” to law enforcement generally, not
just the 911 emergency system.72 As an officer informed Seth Rogen’s
character in the film Neighbors, “We have caller ID, we’re cops, everybody
has caller ID.”73
Nevertheless, the second part of the Court’s analysis—which found that
the tip in Navarette created reasonable suspicion of driving under the
influence—does deviate from the State’s position. As explained above, the
66 Id.
67 See

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority as finding
the reasonable suspicion requirement satisfied whenever a 911 caller reports “a single instance of
possibly careless or reckless driving,” “[s]o long as the caller identifies where the car is”).
68 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
69 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 16, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993)).
70 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
71 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268 (explaining that officers arrived at the bus stop six minutes after
being dispatched, but noting that the record did not indicate how much time had elapsed since the
phone call).
72 See id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73 Neighbors (I) (2014) Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2004420/trivia?tab=qt&ref_=
tt_trv_qu (last visited Sept. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9NK8-CKFM.
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Court reasoned that driving another vehicle off the road is not merely “a
conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving” or “an isolated example
of recklessness.”74 The State, by contrast, took the view that reasonable
suspicion can be based on a tip about “reckless driving,”75 which seems the
paradigmatic illustration of a “conclusory allegation” of reckless driving.
Moreover, as Justice Alito noted at oral argument, informants typically are
not “able to say” a particular driver is drunk because “all they [can] observe
is what they see.”76
Thus, Orin Kerr correctly pointed out that the Court did not give the
State “the bright-line rule that [it] really wanted.”77 The Court did not pick
up on the J.L. dictum and decide that drunk driving poses such “extraordinary
dangers”78 that the usual rules do not apply, and it did not defend the
sweeping statement that reasonable suspicion arises whenever a 911 caller
reports having observed drunk or reckless driving. But it is less clear that
Professor Kerr was right to applaud the majority for deciding the case on
“appropriately narrow grounds,” applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis rather than articulating a less extreme bright-line test.79
In fact, it is not much of a stretch to read Navarette as announcing a rule
that reasonable suspicion of drunk driving arises from any anonymous tip
that (1) describes a car and its location, (2) claims to have observed (3) a
single incident of behavior like weaving between lanes, and (4) proves to be
accurate with respect to the car and its location. There is nothing inherently
objectionable about bright lines, though the Court can be criticized for
selectively endorsing only those rules that tend to favor the prosecution.
More problematic, however, is the fact that any further dilution of the
second or third requirement effectively would give the State what it “really
wanted” and runs counter to the unanimous ruling in J.L.
The anonymous tip in J.L. was missing only the second of these four
factors. It was, in the Court’s words, just “the bare report of an unknown,
unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun
nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.”80
Thus, it was the Navarette caller’s personal observation that, like the
74 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014); see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490).
76 Id. at 45.
77 Orin Kerr, Six Thoughts on Navarette v. California, THE VOLOKH C ONSPIRACY (Apr.

22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/22/six-thoughts-onnavarette-v-california, archived at http://perma.cc/7DW4-8P4X.
78 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
79 Kerr, supra note 77.
80 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
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prediction of future behavior in Alabama v. White and Illinois v. Gates,81
suggested she had a reliable basis for her information. Without evidence of the
informant’s eyewitness status, the tip merely “tend[ed] to identify a determinate
person,”82 providing the same type of information “[a]nyone could have”
supplied,83 that the White Court considered unhelpful84 and the J.L. Court
found inadequate.85
Similarly, any expansion of the type of driving behavior that satisfies the
third element of the Navarette rule increases the risk of targeting innocent
activity. Even the conduct that the Court suggested can create reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving—swerving and weaving between lanes86—has a
number of credible explanations other than intoxication. The driver may be
trying to avoid hitting a pothole or an animal, checking on a child in the
back seat, or changing the radio station.87 These alternative scenarios
become even more plausible if the police are unable to verify anything other
than impeccable driving over a five-minute period—especially given that
concealing a weapon is easier than either masking a high blood-alcohol level
or driving without committing some petty traffic violation. If courts allow
vaguer observations or more minor infractions to satisfy this third element,
the definition of reasonable suspicion emerging from Navarette becomes
susceptible to even greater overinclusiveness.
CONCLUSION
Thus, notwithstanding its protestations, the Court’s recent rulings defining
probable cause and reasonable suspicion have deviated from Gates and its
progeny, creating drug-dog and drunk-driving exceptions to the totality-of-

81 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983).
82 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
83 White, 496 U.S. at 332; see also Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (pointing out that the description of the Petitioners’ vehicle and location conveyed
“generally available” information that “everyone in the world who saw the car would have” and
that “anyone who wanted the car stopped would have to provide”).
84 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
86 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
87 See id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Petitioners’ “truck might have swerved to
avoid an animal, a pothole, or a jaywalking pedestrian”); Brief of National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers & National Association of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 14-15, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490) (observing that seemingly erratic
driving could result from “momentary inattention while adjusting the radio, justifiable distraction
from a dangerous insect, swerving quickly to miss an animal running onto the road, and a flat tire
or other car trouble”).

8 Kinports Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

9/15/2014 7:52 PM

PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION

87

the-circumstances approach. Florida v. Harris has the practical effect of
adopting the sweeping rule that a positive alert by a certified or recently
trained drug dog gives rise to probable cause. Navarette v. California essentially
articulated a rigid test that reasonable suspicion of driving under the
influence arises whenever an anonymous informant reports having observed
even one instance of certain reckless driving behaviors. In both decisions,
the Court exhibited overconfidence in the reliability of narcotics dogs and
911 callers. The Court’s miscalculation threatens to become even more
problematic if, in the wake of Navarette, courts loosely interpret the requirement
that informants must assert eyewitness status or expand the types of careless
driving behaviors allowed to create reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.
Any such extension of Navarette would lead to an even broader bright-line
rule that runs directly counter to J.L. and effectively endorses a drunk-driving
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion requirements.
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